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Abstract 
Classically, risk is characterised by a point value 
probability indicating the likelihood of occur­
rence of an adverse effect. However, there are 
domains where the attainability of objective 
numerical risk characterisations is increasingly 
being questioned. This paper reviews the argu­
ments in favour of extending classical techniques 
of risk assessment to incorporate meaningful 
qualitative and weak quantitative risk characteri­
sations. A technique in which linguistic uncer­
tainty terms are defined in terms of patterns of 
argument is then proposed. The technique is dem­
onstrated using a prototype computer-based sys­
tem for predicting the carcinogenic risk due to 
novel chemical compounds. 
1 INTRODUCTION1 
In the complex and dynamic world in which we live, risk 
assessment is taking an increasingly important role in both 
public and private decision and policy making. Decisions 
made on the basis of the possibility of global warming, for 
example, may have far reaching financial, environmental 
and sociological consequences. Equally, an inability to 
persuade a local authority to accept a subjective assess­
ment of risk due to a "dangerous" road may have serious 
and tragic personal consequences. These two examples 
have been deliberately chosen as they can both be used to 
illustrate the extreme difficulty of providing a reliable 
point value measure of the likelihood of realisation of a 
perceived hazard. Nevertheless, the potential adverse con­
sequences are so great that some meaningful risk charac­
terisation is needed to enable a coherent decision to be 
made on the appropriate action. 
This paper explores the problem of risk assessment in a 
domain, chemical carcinogenicity, for which quantitative 
risk assessment has been widely and publicly questioned 
(Carter, 1991). Some of the arguments against quantitative 
risk assessment in certain domains will be rehearsed in the 
next section. It should be emphasised that the argument is 
not against the use of quantitative risk assessment per se. 
Rather, that there are situations where traditional methods 
1 An extended version of this paper, with larger screen images, is availa­
ble via anonymous ftp from acl.icnet.uk in -ftp/pub/StAR/qual_risk.ps. 
of risk assessment need extending to enable weak quanti­
tative, or even purely qualitative statements of risk to be 
made. A specific interest of the authors is the development 
of a computer-based assistant for the assessment of poten­
tial carcinogenic risk of novel chemical compounds. An 
early prototype of this system will be used as a focus for 
discussing some approaches that have been taken to the 
qualitative and weak quantitative assessment of risk. 
This paper does not claim to provide a full solution to the 
problem of qualitative risk assessment, although the 
results obtained to date are promising. The main reason for 
writing this paper at this stage is that this is a very impor­
tant issue and needs to be raised as a matter of urgency. It 
is an unfortunate fact of life that information relating to 
many of the risks we face in our daily lives is often sparse 
and incomplete. If the uncertainty community could bend 
its collective mind to providing techniques for effective 
risk assessment and communication in such domains, this 
would be a major contribution to society as a whole. 
2 THE CASE FOR NON-NUMERICAL 
RISK ASSESSMENT - NOT ENOUGH 
DEATHS 
For certain technologies, such as electronic systems, civil­
engineering structures and mechanical systems, estab­
lished statistical models are available for making precise 
and reliable estimates of the likelihood of system failure. 
Significant quantities of historical data on the failure rates 
of standard components may be available, for example, or 
it may be possible to generate reliable simulations of sys­
tem behaviour. Nevertheless, the contention that an objec­
tive, scientific assessment of risk is an achievable goal is 
being questioned. A 1992 report on Risk Assessment pub­
lished by Britain's Royal Society included the comment 
that 
the view that a separation can be maintained between 
"objective" risk and "subjective" or perceived risk has 
come under increasing attack, to the extent that it is no 
longer a mainstream position. (Roy. Soc., 1992) 
That is, there is no such thing as "objective" risk. Rather, 
risk is culturally constructed (see the next paragraph for an 
example of this). In fact, this quotation rather overstates 
the case in the context of the mainstream research and lit­
erature on safety and risk management. For example, Brit-
Is There a Role for Qualitative Risk Assessment? 387 
ain's Department of Transport draws a firm distinction 
between "actual" danger (objective risk) and perceived 
danger (subjective risk). Their position is that if a road 
does not have a fatality rate above a certain threshold 
which is considered normal, and therefore acceptable, it 
will not be eligible for funds for measures to improve 
safety ("normal" is about 1.2 fatalities per 100 million 
vehicle kilometres). Nevertheless, their position can lead 
to conflict. Consider the following scenario. 
Increasing traffic over the years leads to a straight road 
through a residential area being considered "dangerous" 
by local residents. They plead with the local authority for 
something to be done to calm the traffic. In the meantime, 
children are warned to stay away from the road if possible, 
and to take extreme care if they do need to cross the road 
for any reason. As a result, the fatality rate on that road 
stays low - people are taking extra care not to expose 
themselves to a situation which they perceive as poten­
tially risky. The local authority has no observable measure 
of increased risk, so nothing is done. Then a tragic acci­
dent does take place. Amidst public outcry, the local 
authority promises that traffic calming measures will be in 
place at the earliest opportunity. Which was the real risk: 
the perceived risk of the residents, or the objective risk 
(estimate) of the local authority? 
Sadly, this is not an academic exercise. In 1991, Britain's 
Permanent Secretary for the Department of Transport 
announced that "funds for traffic calming will be judged 
on casualty savings, not environmental improvements or 
anxiety relief' (Brown, 1991). This extreme position has 
lead to many conflicts between local people and the 
Department of Transport, very tragically with conse­
quences not dissimilar to the above hypothetical scenario. 
More recently the situation has changed slightly, but the 
whole issue of the distinction between one person's per­
ceived risk and another's objective (estimate of) risk 
remains a major source of conflict in many fields (Adams, 
1995). Although it is not possible to quantify the subjec­
tive perceptions of risk, statistics are available on the risk 
management activities that are taken in response to these 
subjective judgements: 
In 1971, for example, 80 per cent of seven and eight 
year old children in England travelled to school on 
their own, unaccompanied by an adult. By 1990 this 
figure had dropped to 9 per cent; the questionnaire sur­
vey disclosed that the parents' main reason for not 
allowing their children to travel independently was fear 
of traffic. (Adams, 1995, p.l3) 
The above provides an example in which an authority has 
an objective estimate of risk which can be expressed as a 
single number (fatalities per so-many vehicle kilometres). 
This is questioned by a public which has a quite different 
perception of risk which they find much harder to express, 
other than through an extended debate with the authority. 
There are situations, however, where the authorities them­
selves cannot agree on an objective measure of risk. One 
such is the assessment of carcinogenicity due to chemicals. 
This will be the focus of attention for the remainder of this 
paper. 
Of over five million known chemical substances, only 
thirty are definitely linked with cancer in humans, and 
only 7,000 have been tested for carcinogenicity: the 
rest is darkness. (Adams, 1995) 
There are a number of approaches which one might take to 
assessing the carcinogenic risk due to a certain chemical. 
The surest way of obtaining a reliable, objective risk esti­
mate is to establish a causal mechanism and/or obtain 
direct statistical data on a population of humans that have 
been exposed to the chemical. Clearly, it would be unac­
ceptable to subject a population to a controlled release of 
the chemical, but epidemiological data are sometimes 
available on a population which is known to have been 
exposed in the past to a chemical (cigarette smoking is a 
case in point). However, as the quote from John Adams 
indicates, such information is available for very few chem­
icals. By far the most frequently used techniques for trying 
to establish the carcinogenic risk due to chemicals involve 
in vivo or in vitro tests. In the case of in vivo tests, regular 
doses of the substance under study are delivered to a popu­
lation of test animals. The relative increase in tumour inci­
dence with respect to a control population, as a function of 
dosage, is then used as the basis for an estimate of the 
increased risk to humans through exposure to the same 
substance. This estimate requires, however, a number of 
extrapolations to be made. In order for the experiment to 
be carried out within an acceptably short period of time, 
the test animals are subjected to a much higher dose rate 
than would be anticipated in the human population, so the 
first extrapolation is from a high dose rate to a low dose 
rate. Secondly, the results must be extrapolated across spe­
cies from a population of test animals to humans. 
The nature and validity of both forms of extrapolation are 
the subject of wide ranging disagreements between 
experts. Figure 1, for example, shows a number of alterna­
tive dose-response extrapolations from the same empirical 
data. It can be seen that the resulting risk predictions at  
low dose rates vary by many orders of  magnitude. The 
extrapolation between animals and humans is subject to an 
equally high degree of disagreement. In an extreme case, 
suppose a chemical is seen to induce an increased inci­
dence of tumours on a gland in rats that has no analogue in 
humans. What conclusions can be realistically made about 
that chemical's potential carcinogenicity in humans? Even 
without considering the moral position associated with 
such experiments, serious questions can be asked about the 
ultimate value of such tests as predictors of human carci­
nogenic risk. 
In the case of in vitro tests, such as the Ames Test (Ashby 
& Tennant, 1991), a "test tube" experiment is carried out 
to see if the chemical under study can induce mutations in 
DNA. However, although genetic mutation is a necessary 
prerequisite to the development of a cancer, mutagenicity 
is not a sufficient criterion for carcinogenisis. In addition, a 
"carcinogen" may not directly cause the genetic mutation 
that induces a cancer; it may play a role in facilitating 
rather than directly causing the genetic damage. Therefore, 
the results of in vitro tests as predictors of carcinogenic 
risk are also open to a wide range of interpretations (e.g. 
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Figure 1: Results of alternative dose-response extrapola­
tions from the same empirical data (after National 
Research Council, 1 992). Extra Risk is the increase in 
probability of occurrence of an adverse effect, as a func­
tion of dose, above the probability of occurrence of that 
effect in the population as a whole. 
Ashby, 1994 ). 
In this domain questioning the value of "objective" point 
value measures of risk really is the mainstream position. 
The report of the UK Department of Health's Committee 
on Carcinogenicity of Chemicals in Food (Carter, 1992) 
concludes: 
The committee does not support the routine use of 
quantitative risk assessment for chemical carcinogens. 
This is because the present models are not validated, 
are often based on incomplete or inappropriate data, 
are derived more from mathematical assumptions than 
from a knowledge of biological mechanisms and, at 
least at present, demonstrate a disturbingly wide varia­
tion in risk estimates depending on the model adopted. 
Nevertheless, there are still situations when a meaningful 
risk characterisation is needed. The next section will intro­
duce the StAR risk assessment project, and then the paper 
will continue with a discussion of the approaches to 
extending the scope of risk assessment which are being 
developed within that project. 
3 GOALS OF StAR1 
The approach to risk assessment which will be reported in 
this paper is being developed in the project StAR (for 
Standardised Argument Report). The top level goals of this 
project are: 
• to develop a computer-based aid to risk assessment 
which can systematically accommodate diverse types of 
evidence, both qualitative and quantitative; 
1The StAR consortium consists of: Judson Consulting; Imperial Cancer 
Research Fund, London; LHASA UK, School of Chemistry, Leeds Uni­
versity; Logic Programming Associates (LPA), London; Psychology 
Department, City University, London. 
• to develop techniques for risk communication which are 
both comprehensive and intelligible. 
StAR draws on earlier work on the development of a model 
for reasoning under uncertainty based on a simple intuitive 
notion of constructing arguments "for" and "against" a 
hypothesis (Fox et al., 1992). The net support for the 
hypothesis may then be evaluated using one of a number 
of techniques; the choice being dependent on the nature of 
the evidence available. Full details of the syntax and 
semantics of the formal model of argumentation may be 
found in (Krause et al., 1995a). 
This project is to a great extent problem driven. A concrete 
goal is to develop a risk adviser to support the prediction 
of carcinogenic risk due to novel chemical compounds. 
The problems of toxicological risk assessment in general 
have been introduced above, and are discussed in more 
detail in (Krause et al., 1 995b ). The following points sum­
marise both these discussions: 
• toxicological risk assessments for chemicals may at best 
cover a very wide range of possible values; 
• point value estimates conceal the uncertainties inherent 
in risk estimates; 
• judgements based on the comparison of point values 
may be quite different from those based on the compari­
son of ranges of possible values; 
• in very many cases the spread of possible values for a 
given risk assessment may be so great that a numerical 
risk assessment is completely meaningless. 
Our aim is to allow the incorporation of numerical data 
where available, and to allow a grading of risk characteri­
sation from quantitative through semi- or weak-quantita­
tive to qualitative, contingent on the reliability and 
accuracy of the data available. The purely qualitative risk 
characterisation is the most controversial of these, and is in 
most need of discussion. Hence, this will form the focus of 
the major part of the remainder of this paper. 
4 QUALITATIVE TERMS FOR RISK 
ASSESSMENT 
The need for some form of qualitative risk characterisation 
has long been accepted by the U.S. International Agency 
for Research on Cancer (IARC) and Environmental Pro­
tection Agency (EPA). Their joint proposal for a qualita­
tive classification scheme will be discussed in this section. 
This will be contrasted with a more general proposal for 
"symbolic uncertainty". 
Both of the following approaches use terms whose seman­
tics is defined in terms of logical states. This contrasts fun­
damentally with most of the existing work on the use of 
linguistic uncertainty terms, in which the underlying 
semantics is assumed to be probabilistic (e.g. Budescu & 
Wallsten, 1995). 
IARC Classification System. 
This is based on the U.S. EPA classification scheme. It 
uses a small set of terms which are defined to represent the 
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current state of evidence. They take as their basis a classi­
fication of the weight of evidence for carcinogenicity into 
five groups for each of human studies and animal studies. 
These classifications are summarised here, but are defined 
precisely in (U.S. EPA, 1986). 
For human studies, the classifications are: 
Sufficient evidence of carcinogenicity. There is an estab­
lished causal relationship between the agent and human 
cancer. 
Limited evidence of carcinogenicity. A causal relation­
ship is credible but not established. 
Inadequate evidence. Few available data, or data unable 
to support the hypothesis of a causal relationship. 
No data. Self-explanatory. 
No evidence. No association was found between expo­
sure and increased incidence of cancer in well-conducted 
epidemiological studies. 
Similar classifications can be defined for animal studies. 
Data obtained from these classifications are then used to 
provide an overall categorization of the weight of evidence 
for human carcinogenicity (again, full definitions can be 
found in U.S. EPA, 1986): 
Known Human Carcinogen: 
Sufficient evidence from human (epidemiological) stud­
ies. 
Probable Human Carcinogen: 
Sufficient animal evidence and evidence of human carci­
nogenicity, or at least limited evidence from human (epi­
demiological) studies. 
Possible Human Carcinogen: 
Sufficient animal evidence but inadequate human evi­
dence, or limited evidence from human studies in the 
absence of sufficient animal evidence. 
Not Classifiable: 
Inadequate animal evidence and inadequate human evi­
dence, but sufficient evidence of carcinogenicity in 
experimental animals. 
Non carcinogenic to Humans: 
Evidence for lack of carcinogenicity. 
Note that these uncertainty terms are defined specifically 
in the context of carcinogenicity risk assessment. Our crit­
icism of them is primarily on this basis. It would be more 
useful to see a set of terms which were defined at a higher 
level of abstraction. This would enable their intention to be 
communicable to a person who was not necessarily famil­
iar with the details of risk assessment in a specific domain. 
It would also enable their usage to be standardised across a 
wide range of domains. 
Elvang-G�ransson et a)'s "logical uncertainty" terms. 
An alternative set of terms with a precise mathematical 
characterisation was defined in (Elvang-G�ransson et al., 
1993). These terms take the notion of logical provability as 
primitive. They then express successively increasing 
degrees of "acceptability" of the arguments which support 
the propositions of interest; as one progresses down the list 
there is a decrease in the tension between arguments for 
and against, a hypothesis P. A precise characterisation of 
these terms is quite lengthy, and so is not reproduced here. 
Full details and a discussion of their properties can be 
found in (Krause et al., 1995a). The following is intended 
to give a reasonably intuitive informal description. 
P is open 
if it is any well-formed formula in the language of the 
logic (one may be unable to construct any arguments 
concerning it, however). 
P is supported 
if an argument, possibly using inconsistent data, can be 
constructed for it. 
P is plausible 
if a consistent argument can be constructed for it (one 
may also be able to construct a consistent argument 
against it). 
P is probable 
if a consistent argument can be constructed for it, and no 
consistent argument can be constructed against it. 
P is confirmed 
if it satisfies the conditions of being probable and, in 
addition, no consistent arguments can be constructed 
against any of the premises used in its supporting argu­
ment. 
P is certain 
if it is a tautology of the logic. This means that its valid­
ity is not contingent on any data in the knowledge-base. 
No quantitative information is used in the definition of 
these terms; they use purely logical constructions. How­
ever, it should be clear that they allow a unidimensional 
scaling. 
A problem still remains. Although these terms do have a 
precise definition, it is an open question whether they have 
"cognitive validity" (see the next section). If not, then they 
will be open to misinterpretation as a vehicle for commu­
nication. 
5 THE StAR DEMONSTRATOR 
An alternative strategy to either of the above is to see if it 
is possible to establish specific patterns of argument as 
qualitative landmarks. The aim is then to associate those 
patterns with linguistic terms in a way which has "cogni­
tive validity"; that is, where the definitions reflect in some 
way people's intuitive usage of the associated terms. In 
order to explore these ideas further, a risk assessment dem­
onstrator has been built which uses a small set of linguistic 
terms as part of the reporting facility. A brief run-through 
of the demonstrator will be used in this section to illustrate 
the general approach. Some more detailed definitions of 
argument structures will be given in the next section. Note 
that the linguistic terms used in this section are for illustra­
tion only, the precise choice of terms being the subject of 
ongoing work. 
The demonstrator is a prototype for a computer based 
assistant for the prediction of the potential carcinogenic 
risk due to novel chemical compounds. A notion of hazard 
390 Krause, Fox, and Judson 
identification is taken as a preliminary stage in the assess­
ment of risk. The hazard identification used here draws 
heavily on the approach taken in the expert system 
DEREK, which is used for the qualitative prediction of 
possible toxic action of chemical compounds (Sanderson 
& Earnshaw, 1 99 1). DEREK is able to detect chemical 
sub-structures within molecules, known as structural 
alerts, and relate these to a rule-base linking them with 
likely types of toxicity. In the demonstration, the structural 
alerts have been taken from a U.S. FDA report identifying 
sub-structures associated with various forms of carcino­
genic activity (U.S. FDA, 1 986). 
The user of the carcinogenicity risk adviser presents the 
system with the chemical structure of the compound to be 
assessed, together with any additional information which 
may be thought relevant (such as possible exposure routes, 
or species of animal that will be exposed to the chemical). 
The chemical structure may be presented using a graphical 
interface. 
The database of structural alerts is then searched for 
matches against the entered structure. If a match is found, 
a theorem prover tries to construct arguments for or 
against the hazard being manifest in the context under con­
sideration. Having constructed all the relevant arguments, 
a report is generated on the basis of the available evidence. 
For ease of presentation, the examples use a very simpli­
fied database, and some of the following assessments may 
be chemically or biologically naive. 
In the first example, the structure for aniline has been 
drawn. This is normally regarded as a carcinogen. How­
ever, in this instance, the interest is in assessing the chemi-
cal in the context of · · · to it. 
UseriD: 
IP_Krausej 
In this case, the following report is generated. 
Hazard 
...,.._ W ••oaivocU..b•u.t • .-.--.. llOJlM.._c_...,ldc. (lk�l, ......_'7') 
It .. _ eoat..ia U.JLu:.n.aleri-JR&tic_....W •�•••ldaat c  •­
S......r, altJ.o,.P hftM�reftM- ........ ll.u"eilw-- MdftQro 
thuoe iiJ •--ar U'C'IJM!ftt. 
:t.l>Z 
....... _ ... �,2:) ce.t&iM_IIIltft(IIH.-dr:_..U..) 
lesP(llOJ,2.3) 
The system has concluded that the case for the substance 
being carcinogenic is "equivocal". A hazard alert for a 
proximate carcinogen has been found (the structure is an 
aromatic amine), but there is evidence both for (the chemi­
cal has a logP value which indicates that it will be easily 
absorbed into fatty tissue), and against (the chemical is 
unlikely to be metabolised into a direct acting carcinogen) 
realisation of the hazard. To simplify the construction of 
the report, the arguments are summarised by simply listing 
the grounds, basic facts, used in constructing each argu­
ment. Work is underway to provide a more easily assimila­
ble summarisation of the argument at this stage. The user 
may click on either argument to obtain a more detailed 
explanation. 
Had the value provided for logP been below 2.0, then the 
following report would have been generated. 
Hazard 
It will be noticed that these two reports also contain some 
numerical information as part of the risk report. The argu­
mentation model permits a measure of confidence in a 
hypothesis which is equivalent to the Dempster-Shafer 
probability of provability (Krause et a!., 1995a). If numeri­
cal coefficients are available for all the relevant axioms, 
then measures of belief and plausibility can be given for 
the risk statement. It can be seen that the qualitative behav­
iour of these coefficients follows the linguistic term used 
in the report (the "equivocal" report has Bel=0.68, 
Pl=0.76; the "improbable" report has Bel=O.OO, Pl=0.24). 
The linguistic terms are not, however, defined in terms of 
fixed probability intervals. 
Issues arise about the precise interpretation of these num­
bers, however, and these will be discussed in section 7. 
6 ARGUMENTS AND CASES 
The previous section introduced the concept of matching 
linguistic uncertainty terms to structures of arguments. 
The thesis is that certain useful structures can be identified 
as "landmarks" in the space of all possible argument struc­
tures, and that natural language is capable of capturing the 
distinctions between these landmarks (Fox, 1 986; Fox & 
Krause, 1991). 
Some example definitions of such landmarks will be given 
in this section. A more extensive set of definitions can be 
found in (Fox & Krause, 1994). Experiments are currently 
under way to see if linguistic terms can be consistently 
associated in a meaningful way with such patterns of argu­
ment. 
As a starting point four distinct "epistemic" states for a 
proposition p can usefully be distinguished: p is con-
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firmed; p is supported; p is opposed; p is excluded. It is 
useful to agree a notation to distinguish succinctly 
between these states. The following has been used in ear­
lier work (Fox et al., 1992): 
p:+ = "p is supported" 
p:- = "p is opposed" 
p:++ = "p is confirmed" 
p:- = "p is excluded" 
6.1 ARGUMENTS 
We wish to raise arguments to the level of "first class 
objects" so that we may reason about them, as well as 
about the propositions of interest. A way of achieving this 
is to actually identify those facts and rules which are used 
to construct the argument: 
Definition 6.1.1 
If 0 c !1 is minimal such that 0 f- p, then (O,p) is an argu­
ment for p from !1. o itself is referred to as the grounds of 
the argument. 
If we now add in the above notation, we are able to distin­
guish four different basic classes of argument: 
If 0 f- p:+, then (O,p) is a supporting argument; 
If 0 f- p:-, then (o,p) is an opposing argument; 
If 0 f- p:++, then (O,p) is a confirming argument; 
If 0 f- p:-, then (o,p) is an excluding argument. 
6.2 CASES 
The set of all arguments which impact on a single proposi­
tion, constitutes the case concerning that proposition: 
Definition 6.2.1 
For a given proposition p 
{(o,p): 3q E {++, +, -, -} • 0 f- p:q} is the "case con­
cerning p". 
Two sub-cases of an overall case can be usefully distin­
guished: 
Definition 6.2.2 
For a given proposition p 
{(o,p): 3q E {++, +} • 0 f- p:q} is the "case forp"; 
{ (o,p) : 3q E {-,-} • o f- p:q} is the "case against p". 
By altering the conditions on the kind of arguments, we 
may be able to define other useful sub-cases of an overall 
case. 
6.3 CLASSES OF CASES 
One further item of notation needs to be introduced now. 
Definition 6.3.1 
l(o,p)l is the "weight" of the argument (o,p). 
I { (O,p) : conditions} I is the aggregate weight of those argu­
ments (O,p) satisfying conditions. 
The latter may be just a "head count". This will usually be 
indicated by comparing the weight to some integer. For 
example I{(O,p): 3q E {++, +} • 0 f- p:q}l � 1 might be 
paraphrased as "there are one or more arguments for p". In 
contrast 
I{(O,p):3q E{++, +}•O f- p:q}l 
> I{(O,p): 3q E {-, -}. 0 f- p:q}l 
means the aggregate weight of the case for is greater than 
the case against (be it a head count, probabilistic aggrega­
tion, or whatever). 
Patterns identifying "classes of cases" can now be defined. 
Here are some examples. The first is a general pattern for 
all those cases where there are both arguments for and 
arguments against, the second where there are arguments 
for, but at least one excluding argument, and so on. For 
each pattern, an English language gloss precedes the for­
mal definition. 
For a given proposition p: 
There is both a case for and a case against p. The term 
"equivocal" was used to describe this structure in the dem­
onstrator. 
I{(O,p): 3q E {++, +}. 0 f- p:q}l > 0 
& I{(O,p):3q E{-,-}•0 f- p:q}I>O 
There is a case for p, but at least one excluding argument 
l{(o,p):3q e{++, +}•o r- p:qJI>O 
& l{(o,p): o f- p:-}1 > 0 
p has been confirmed, but there is still a case against p 
l{(o,p): o f- p:++}I>O 
& l{(o,p):3q e{-,-J•o r- p:qJI>O 
p has been both confirmed and excluded 
l{(o,p): o f- p:++}I>O 
& l{(o,p): o f- p:-}1 > 0 
The last pattern means that it is possible to derive a contra­
diction in the classical sense. We can write the argument 
for the contradiction as (o, .l). 
In a similar way, groups of patterns can be defined cover­
ing the situations where: either there is no case against, or 
there are at least no excluding arguments; there is either no 
case for, or at least there are no confirming arguments; and 
where purely negative statements are made about the state 
of evidence (Fox & Krause, 1994). It is not clear whether 
all of these will be useful, however. 
Apart from distinguishing between support and confirma­
tion (or opposition and exclusion), the above patterns do 
not make any distinctions with respect to the weight of 
evidence. The following basic distinctions can be made. 
For single arguments (O,p) and (y,p), where o f- p:+ and y 
f- p:-
A supporting and an opposing argument are of equal 
weight 
I (o,p) I= I (y,p) I 
The supporting argument is stronger than the opposing 
argument 
I (o,p) I> I (y,p) I 
The supporting argument is weaker than the opposing 
argument 
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l(o,p) I< I (y,p) I 
Analogous patterns can be defined for sets of arguments. 
Finally, there is the possibility that arguments themselves 
may be attacked. There is scope here for quite complex 
interactions between arguments; attacking arguments, 
attacking arguments that attack arguments, and so on. 
The above just gives a selection of argument structures 
that may be useful as qualitative landmarks. To continue to 
develop the thesis outlined at the beginning of this section, 
we need to answer two questions. Which of these land­
marks are recognised as important? Of those that are 
important in evaluating states of evidence, what is the lan­
guage people use to recognise them? 
Experiments are being designed to see if it is possible for 
subjects to classify examples of these abstract definitions 
consistently into categories where the members of each 
category consist of arguments conforming to the same, or 
a similar, abstract definition. If this is achievable, then the 
experimental work will move on to study whether linguis­
tic terms can be meaningfully and consistently associated 
with these categories. 
7 DISCUSSION 
There is an important difference between the system of 
argumentation that has just been presented, and the non­
monotonic models that incorporate mechanisms of defeat 
and rebuttal such as Poole (1985), Nute (1988), Loui 
(1987) and the various default logics. In the non-monot­
onic argumentation models, defeat and rebuttal may result 
in conclusions being retracted from the current belief state. 
This is not the case here. The argument structure is pre­
sented to the user, and the evidence state summarised by 
qualifying the conclusion with a linguistic term. This term 
indicates the general class of argument structures to which 
the specific case belongs. It is then up to the users of the 
system to be more, or less, cautious about which conclu­
sions they accept, rather than the designer of the argument 
system. 
This has important implications for risk communication. 
Even if the risk of some adverse effect has been strongly 
discounted, the risk is still presented together with the jus­
tification(s) for discounting that risk. The intent is that the 
risk characterisation should be transparent to the recipient, 
and he or she acts as final arbiter. The major benefit of this 
is that there is an explicit representation of the state of evi­
dence concerning a proposition. However, the provision of 
a decision rule to aid the user in acting on the basis of the 
qualitative risk characterisation still needs to be addressed. 
This paper focuses on qualitative risk assessment because 
it is the aspect of the StAR project that is most in need of 
discussion. However, the aim is to incorporate weak-quan­
titative and quantitative risk characterisations where possi­
ble. As indicated in section 5, some questions arise from 
this. 
Where numerical coefficients have been associated with 
the axioms in the demonstrator's database, their precise 
value was to a certain extent arbitrary as their use here is 
merely intended to be illustrative. Nevertheless, an impor­
tant question is raised. In this context, what precisely 
should the numbers mean? Remember that the system is 
intended to give some form of risk prediction, drawing on 
some prior general knowledge about indicators for poten­
tial carcinogenic activity. Should a numerical value, or 
interval of possible values indicate: 
o the lifetime likelihood of someone being exposed to the 
chemical developing cancer; 
or 
o a subjective estimate of belief in the statement "this 
chemical is carcinogenic"? 
Given the difficulty of assessing risk due to chemicals that 
have been subject to some experimental study, discussed 
in section 2, it does not seem realistic to suppose that 
meaningful probabilities could be assigned to the general 
indicators of risk that are used in the StAR database. How­
ever, it may be possible to elicit subjective indications of 
the relative plausibility of the conclusions drawn from the 
generic knowledge that is elicited for the StAR database. 
So, whilst 1) above is unlikely to be achievable, an ability 
to include a value or range of values that conform to 2) 
may be realistic, at least in certain circumstances. 
The StAR database can be viewed as consisting of facts 
(about the structure of the chemical of interest, its physical 
properties and the context in which it will be used) 
together with generic knowledge about possible mecha­
nisms of carcinogenicity (chemical sub-structures with 
believed associations with carcinogenic activity, possible 
metabolic pathways, exposure routes, and so on). From 
this knowledge, StAR draws plausible conclusions. It may 
well be that it would be more appropriate to model the 
generic knowledge as conditional assertions (Dubois and 
Prade, 1 994) rather than by the more naive approach of 
rules with certainty coefficients as used here. In fact, the 
definition of an argument used in this paper is consistent 
with that of Benferhat, Dubois and Prade (Benferhat et al., 
1 993 ). Hence a possibilistic encoding of rational inference 
may be an appropriate unifying framework for the qualita­
tive and quantitative aspects of the risk characterisation, in 
the context where the numerical coefficient indicates a 
measure of plausibility of the conclusion. 
A crucial issue is still outstanding, however. Although this 
paper offers some ideas for qualitative and (semi-)quanti­
tative risk characterisations in the absence of reliable sta­
tistical data, there still remains the question of how to act 
on the basis of such a risk assessment. The implicit claim 
is that there is scope for fairer decisions to be made if a 
risk assessment is carried out in an argumentation frame­
work, because: 
o the reasoning behind the risk assessment is readily open 
to inspection; 
o a party is able to counter a numerical risk assessment 
with a subjective, but clearly structured, risk characteri­
sation. 
In the case of the carcinogenic risk application being 
developed in StAR, we do not see the decisions that are 
made after consultation with the system as being along the 
lines of "we shall, or shall not allow this chemical into the 
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public arena". Rather, it is intended to assist in the prioriti­
sation of further investigations into the chemical of inter­
est. That is, the decisions in question are of a different type 
from the rational choice of alternatives that is classically 
the domain of decision theory. 
Apart from the specific application, it is hoped that the 
work described on providing a framework for the structur­
ing of cases will contribute to a more orderly debate 
between two parties with differing conceptions of the risk 
associated with a specific situation. 
8 CONCLUSION 
This paper reports work on the development of qualitative 
techniques for risk assessment. The main aim of the paper 
is to bring the motivation for the work into the public 
arena. The main points are: 
• there are situations in which a numerical assessment of 
uncertainty is unrealistic, 
yet; 
• some structured presentation of the case that supports a 
particular assessment may still be required, and is 
achievable. 
The concept of characterising risk by linguistic terms 
defined by relating them to patterns of argument has been 
demonstrated. This was then followed up with more 
detailed definitions of categories of cases (collections of 
arguments) which are being used as the basis for further 
studies. 
This is not just an academic exercise in the use of argu­
ment structures. A solution to the problems outlined in the 
first part of this paper is of vital importance. It is for this 
reason that we wish to bring discussion of this work into 
the public arena at this stage. 
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